Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (As Delivered) Along with Brief Reflections

 

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 Secretary Hegseth recently attended the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue, where he gave what he hoped was an important speech. The event describes itself this way:

Held annually in Singapore, the Dialogue is Asia’s premier defence summit. It enables decision-makers from across the Asia-Pacific, North America, Europe and the Middle East to gather together to discuss the most pressing regional security issues and to share policy responses. It features plenary debates led by government ministers, as well as important opportunities for bilateral discussions among delegations. (here)

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Many leaders spoke at the event. They included (1) President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron delivers the Keynote Address; and (2) Special Address by Dato’ Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim, Prime Minister of Malaysia. There were many panel sessions where people of consequence spoke of many things that could then be summarized and presented to the masses for their consumption--and for the consumption of each other. Indeed, as is now common in thse sorts of events, the object appears to be to pack the speeches with enough text that some of it might prove of interest to the mass marketers of information and in that way contribute to (and influence) the way the event (and the remarks within the larger show) might drive thinking about whatever it is the speaker wishes the audience to think about. There is much that U.S. reality television teaches us about the event--not that it is trivial, but that it is contrived in a way that deeply illustrates the dialectic between leaders and the masses to whom they appeal, as well as the more interesting sub-dialectic among the speakers themselves as they perform for each other as well as for the viewers. This comparison does not make the event as less real or important--but then the same applies to the Real Housewives franchise as well--each driving important cultural and social expectations in their own way.  And each a cultural artifact that may be more important for the event than for the text of any of its speechifying. Still, the speeches, like the wardrobes of the actors on Real Housewives, can send critically important signals and reveal important things to those of us who can only stand and watch from the outside. And this year the drama was all about the attendance of the United States and China, where both acted out to provide an expected level of drama to the event.

China will not send its defense minister to this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, shunning a chance for a high-level meeting with US and Asian counterparts as tensions simmer with Washington. China announced Thursday it will instead be represented by a delegation from the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University, marking the first time in five years a high-level delegation from Beijing will miss Asia’s largest defense and security forum. The United States will be represented by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at the event, which often provides opportunities on the sidelines for rare face-to-face meetings between top generals and defense officials from the US and China. (here)

And, as expected, the Chinese rejected, in the usual colorful way, whatever it was the Secretary of Defense had to say.

China’s top official at a global defence dialogue on Saturday (May 31) rejected “accusations” made against the country as unfounded and politically motivated, and asserted its commitment to protecting and improving regional security. “We do not accept groundless accusations against China. Some of these claims are completely fabricated, some distort the truth, and some are outright cases of ‘the thief crying thief’,” said Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, who is leading a delegation from the National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. (Here)

Well, then, what was it that the Defense Secretary had to say as an official of the United States that produced the expected and necessary public reaction from the Chinese?  On balance, there was little in the speech that has not been said by officials of every administration since the Obama Administration.  And there is little about the longevity of U.S. interests in the Pacific that has not been established tentatively since the 1850s and more robustly (in contextually and historically acceptable ways) since the end of the 19th century. That, though is important.  There is now a longer term (measured  as these things are measured in the United States) and consistent emphasis on the Asian sector in terms of the interest of the United States in its contemporary form. The differences are of style of of the manifestation of that interest in the form of the variations in the politics and ideologies of the various administrations that have populated the White House since the first decade of this century. But the interest remains--whether in the form of the Trans Pacific Partnership, sanctions regimes against the Chinese,  the development of mutual defense pacts among states, or, if this administration actually has the stomach for it (the jury is still out on that) through an aggressive transactions oriented tariff and migration based strategy to  re-orient relations among the leading powers in the Pacific. 

Still, this version of the American vision for the Indo-Pacific (or whatever it is that the region must now be called--any name suits as long as it has the desired effect of constructing from it an acceptably shaped geographical reality that can then be used appropriately to everyone's benefit) reflects another step in shaping the content of the American New Era under the core of leadership of the President. That vision, like everything else in this Administration is transactional:

And under President Trump's leadership, the United States is committed to achieving peace through strength. That starts with deterring aggression around the world and here in the Indo-Pacific, here in our priority theater, here with you — our allies and our partners. The United States stands ready to work with any country that is willing to step up and preserve the global and regional peace that we all hold dear. (Secretary's speech)

One could expect nothing else from our merchant president; but it is also likely to be incomprehensible to the official and warrior castes that populate some of the leadership cultures of allies and opponents.  Merchants make deals with the willing and oppose competitors by any means at least with respect to those interests (the wealth augmenting transactions and perhaps relationships) that drive  the way they view the world.  For officials who prefer to see the world as something that is managed to enhance their objectives  or for warriors who view things in terms of crude power relations for which merchants and officials ought to be made to contribute (and for whose greater glory merchants and official exist in the first place)  deal making will have to be "translated" into their own reality affirming language in order to be useful and usefully responded. 

For merchants, on the other hand, warriors and officials exist merely to enhance the ability fo the merchant to operate.  The warrior is "muscle" and protection. The official services accounts and translates transaction into systems for exploiting productive forces (including labor, warriors and officials), and enhancing their ability to operate within platforms of transactions in which they can act as both producers and consumers of wealth through transactional activity.

And to that end from day one, President Trump gave me a clear mission at the Defense Department: achieve peace through strength. To accomplish this mission, our overriding objectives have been equally clear: restore the warrior ethos, rebuild our military, and reestablish deterrence. And it starts with the warrior ethos. All of us in this profession of arms understand that humans are far more important than hardware. So, we're focused on lethality, meritocracy, accountability, standards, readiness, and warfighting. (Secretary's speech)

But even warriors can be a profit center to someone. "Our second priority is rebuilding the military. We're equipping American warfighters with the most advanced capabilities so that we remain the strongest and most lethal fighting force in the world. . . We're reviving our defense industrial base and investing in our shipyards. We're rapidly fielding emerging technologies that will help us remain the world leader for generations to come. We are stronger — yet more agile — than ever before."  (Secretary's speech).

And every merchant, warrior, and official needs an adversary. For the United States, having done without a Great Adversary since the 1990s, now finds itself with a quite interesting adversary--a frenemy that has become the incarnation of the bete noir for the American elites--at once seduced by the possibility of transposing some of the techniques and sensibilities of Chinese Leninism into American liberal democracy, and at the same time leery of actually doing what it takes to become a Marxist-Leninist state with liberal democratic characteristics. 

Thus, on the one hand, the Secretary sounds like a Chinese official speaking to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization when he says :

 As President Trump also said in Riyadh, the United States is not interested in the moralistic and preachy approach to foreign policy of the past. We are not here to pressure other countries to embrace or adopt policies or ideologies. We are not here to preach to you about climate change or cultural issues. We're not here to impose our will on you. We're all sovereign nations. We should be able to choose the future we want to build. We respect you, your traditions, and your militaries. And we want to work with you where our shared interests align for peace and prosperity. On this sure foundation of mutual interests and common sense, we will build and strengthen our defense partnerships to preserve peace and increase prosperity.(Secretary's speech)

But in the next breath sounds like a merchant who is threatened by an adversary that chooses not to play by the rules but rather seeks not top compete but to dominate in the classical sense as a merchant might understand this:

we do not seek conflict with Communist China. We will not instigate nor seek to subjugate or humiliate. President Trump and the American people have an immense respect for the Chinese people and their civilization. But we will not be pushed out of this critical region. And we will not let our allies and partners be subordinated and intimidated. China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. No doubt. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. Through its massive military build-up and growing willingness to use military force to achieve its goals, including grey zone tactics and hybrid warfare, China has demonstrated that it wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo. * * * China uses its vast and sophisticated cyber capabilities to steal technology and attack critical infrastructure— in your countries and in the United States, as well. These actions not only compromise our countries, but endanger the lives of our citizens. (Secretary's speech)

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The irony, of course, is that is reflects, in military terms, the thinking that drove the shaping of the Trans Pacific Partnership terms by the Obama Administration  before 2016. And then, like a merchant, the Secretary reminded his audience that protection and power is not a charitable enterprise--and that the Trump Administration prefers payment in cash but perhaps in bartering exchanges as well.  "We ask — and indeed, we insist — that our allies and partners do their part on defense. Sometimes, that means having uncomfortable and tough conversations. Partners owe to it to each other to be honest and to be realistic. As many of you have been with me in the past few days and I with you. This is the essence of a pragmatic, common sense defense policy." (Secretary's speech). For the clueless, the Secretary `rovided an example: "look no further than to our growing defense relationship with India, where we pass new milestones by the day—from shared ventures of our defense industries to the increased operational coordination and interoperability between our two militaries." (Ibid.). Others followed as the Secretary wrapped up his remarks. Naming and praising strategies are always useful.

But perhaps it was what was not said that might have been the most important element of the speech--for those leaders in other parts of the world of interest to the United States--and especially Latin America, Europe, and MENA, the same pattern and expectations will likely dominate the relationships with the United States.  I expect that Brazil will resist, but that Mexico will be a far more effective player. That means that trade deals with added defense elements might prove to be more important in the near future, not just in Asia but elsewhere.

The text of the Secretary's speech follows below along with the perhaps more important official summary prepared by officials well versed in these sorts of tasks at the Department of Defense.

 

Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy: Call for Participation for the Jorge Pérez-López Student Award Competition

 

The Jorge Pérez-López Student Award returns for 2025! ASCE invites undergraduate and graduate students from around the world to submit original research papers on the Cuban economy. In addition ot a cash award, winners will be invited to attend the Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy to be held in October 2025 in Miami Florida.

Submissions will be evaluated under a blind review process by a panel of ASCE members, with winners selected in both student categories.

Students: Don’t miss this opportunity to gain recognition and expert feedback on your work!

Faculty and ASCE members: Please share this opportunity with your networks and students.

Deadline: August 1, 2025

Submit papers to: ascecubaoperations@gmail.com

Call for Contributions: Trauma, Reconciliation, and Mnemonic Justice in Modern China

 

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I am delighted to pass along this call for contributions for Tom Gold (Berkeley), Zhiyi Yang (Frankfurt), who are co-editing a volume on "Trauma, Reconciliation, and Mnemonic Justice in Modern China," which might interest to some.

The co-editors note that those who would like to join the project ought to end an abstract in English (max. 250 words) to bin.xu@emory.edu by September 1, 2025. 

The Call for  Contributions follows.

Visa Wars--President Trump and Secretary Rubio Adjust U.S. Visa Policy

 

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The winds of change, and the winds of reaction, appear to be blowing strongly in the U.S. These winds are being generated by the officials of the political and appointed branches of the apparatus, with strong supporting roles by the institutionalized consultation and influencing elements of the unofficial apparatus, each wrapped in the legalities of rule of law narratives that suit them in general, that can be  used as instruments with respect to their status in the apparatus (political(social/institutional) hierarchy to which they belong or serve, and which can be advanced to serve their interests as holders of particular places within those hierarchies.  

None of this is new.  Most political systems find ways of dressing this up in appropriately soothing terms which permit enough of a base for stability and the ordering of "play." Norms are both the objectives and pathways; the ordering of social relations especially with respect to the way in which distributions of power is managed, are the stuff of ideology. And ideology can be sourced in anything that a collective embraces for that purpose. These patterns are so old that academics with little else to do perhaps have sought to make a science of it, spiced from time to time, with the faith in judgments (or the hubris of judging) perfection (but that is a story for another day).  What is discomfiting in the American context is that all of this activity is being undertaken for larger stakes--the organization and normative foundations of the political order that serve as the platform (playground) in which the machinations of these factional/status forces (sometimes as people and sometimes within other institutions) is ordered and the range and approach to "objectives" and "rule" (through law based on approaches to foundational interpretation can (re)set.

And so here the Americans find themselves--old school traditional progressives and their "progeny" reflecting notions of progress that requiring going back even farther in time not in the position of reactionaries to purported revolution; and old school traditionalists playing at revolution to overturn the present in the hope of recapturing a past that is, in its re-imagining, something entirely new. Much of this is being played out in the battles between the President and the Courts, and between the President and the (very) large sector of state dependent  private enterprises--enterprises (whether or not for profit--whatever that means today) that have grown dependent (and perhaps quite fat) on institutionalized systems of governmental largess either in cash or through regulatory largess that they have come to view as a right (if only because its cancellation would adversely affect their economic viability).  All of this is fair.  History produces any number of variations on how an elite capturing a political apparatus then manages control of either threats or necessary parties through high spending institutionalized systems of payments. There is nothing wrong with these systems (from the quite successful efforts of the French monarchy to neuter the threats of their aristocracy through large subsidies and the dilution of their ranks with people more agreeable to the Crown, to systems of managing education through systems of research and other grants  sugar coating regulatory oversight and (for a while now mutual) dependency. If this can be done in a way that aligns with the ruling ideology, its institutionalization (and the protection of the benefit of these transfers of wealth) can be better protected and serve, at its limit, as a means of reinforcing the ruling ideology as well. 

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When well done, all State and many private institutions are made both complicit in the system. And complicity producing an amplification of facilitation by others, and a mechanism for reinforcement of the system on which this is based against those who would replace it with something else.  Tradition, it is said by conservatives, is a powerful force.  But certainly since the 1940s, the progressive forces have also shown how tradition can be parsed, and thus parsed can be used against itself by reinvesting key words (freedom, liberty, equality) and concepts (rule of law, fairness, sovereignty, elections) with new meaning and building state regulatory and social architectures on that effort. And the system has worked reasonably well at protecting itself against challenge  since the 1940s. Conservative and liberal--traditionalist and progressive--are (or were) understood as a function of the ruling ideology and clashes between them were self-controlled by the limits that the ordering premises of the ruling ideology appeared to be able to police.

But the system appeared to invite greater and greater tolerance for challenge both from the progressive end and the traditionalist end, and what was once beyond the barrier of the basic political line of governmental ordering/function/norms appeared now ripe for challenge from both (all) sides. The result has been a growing instability among the ruling factions as their ability or willingness to control the boundaries of the manageable has appeared to slip. While this slippage could be plausibly denied certainly before 2016, it became nearly impossible to do so after 2020. One wind of the factional elements had their turn after 2020; with the election of President Trump in 2024, now the other faction seeks both to challenge the work of the predecessor ruling group and to drive their own transformative vision, not just normative but also in the way in which the apparatus is run and those who might claim a profitable dependence on it. 

One has had to have been asleep since the end of January 2025 to have missed this squabbling and its intense manifestations. One front in the conflict is that between the Presidency and the organized28 May  academy, seen by the current officeholder as inseparably linked to the rival camp, but also vulnerable because their power, and the nature of their relationship depends in some respects to both regulatory benefits Appropriately clothed in plausible and even compelling normative text, visual, and oral performances)  The focus on the academic industry makes tremendous sense from a  political and normative perspective for the Trump Administration.  The academy as currently populated and run, and their relationships within and around the state apparatus pose a substantial challenge to the Trump Administration's "Golden Age" agenda.  And in some respects they are also an unavoidable target serving as the leading forces of many of the initiatives and transformative agendas of the enemy apparatus embedded in and operating through the Administration of President Biden. But the Academy is also the recipient of a substantial amount of subsidy in cash ad regulatory kind that appears to pit the government in the position of subsidizing the political and normative enemies of the current administration. And, of course, academic big wigs and high status factions within it have appeared to stumble badly enough that even their allies in social media and press organs found it difficult to protect them effectively. 

The Administration of President Trump has appeared to adopt a multi-prong strategy against the academic industry that aligns with some of its broader transformational goals (I ought to make clear that for purposes of this essay I take no sides but am trying to understand them the way one might view the ritualized confrontations of sheep, or wolves, though I note that from a personal perspective I regret both in the context in which they were made). One part is regulatory. That aligns with the Administration's efforts to challenge the position, authority and conceits of the courts that have been solidified after 1945. For example and as reported in the New York Times, "Mr. Trump this month said the U.S. government would no longer grant Harvard the right to enroll international students. On Friday, a federal judge issued a temporary restraining order blocking Mr. Trump from moving forward with the action against Harvard and foreign students."  (here). But of course the strategy can backfire discrediting the Administration as abusing its authority.  But the other aligns with the Administration's migration policy while serving as a way to significantly undercut the profitability of the academic industry model (and its leadership role)--and that touches on the ability of the Administration to affect the rate and timing of foreign student admissions to universities. 

To that end two recent initiatives might be worth considering, both originating in the State Department.  The first is elaborated in the 28 May Announcement of a Visa Restriction Policy Targeting Foreign Nationals Who Censor Americans . The second is identified in the New Visa Policies Put America First, Not China of the same date. Both follow in full below. Both will be challenged in the courts of course--but that might well serve the Administration's strategy of discrediting the courts by encouraging them to appear to overstep--that is to overstep in the sense of its use to turn mass sentiment against a legitimate institutionalized judiciary by allowing them to be palliated as partisan. 

The first appeared to be accompanied by a visa issuance pause which, working in tandem with the new visa restriction policy, appeared to aim to reduce the flow of foreign students into U.S. universities (at least). As reported on a Yale University website (and repeated in variation throughout the higher administrative reaches of university operations):

Multiple news outlets have reported that a cable, dated Tuesday, May 27th, and signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has ordered U.S. Embassies and Consulates to pause scheduling new visa interviews for F and J visa applicants. According to these reports the cable reads: “Effective immediately, in preparation for an expansion of required social media screening and vetting, consular sections should not add any additional student or exchange visitor (F, M, and J) visa appointment capacity until further guidance is issued [in a separate telegram], which we anticipate in the coming days.” (here)

The second appeared to be aimed specifically at China. That aligns with the efforts to use challenge the ability of the Chinese State to seek capacity building from U.S. sources, directly anyway, through its Reform and Opening Up program encouraging students to seek an education abroad. It can be coupled with the discourse of the last several months (and earlier as well in different form in the Biden Administration) suggesting that all of these programs produce a security risk to the U.S.and a conduit for the acquisition and transfer of knowledge from the U.S. in ways that the Administration would suggest are unfair and damaging to the U.S. It suggests that students might be presumed to be state agents and that they will be scrutinized accordingly; special scrutiny is reserved for students who are Communist Party of China cadres, though no mention is made of the effect of membership in the Chinese Chinese United Front parties on admission. 

It is too early to tell what effect all of this will have, or even if, as a tactic, is disappears once the Trump Administration's larger objectives appears to be satisfied.  I expect we will see more before all of this plays out completely.

Press Statement: Next Steps on Building an America First State Department--29 May 2025 Proposal

 

Pix Credit US State Department HERE

For those who have been wondering what might have happened to USAID, Secretary Rubio now gives us a clue--it has become embedded in a new and improved organizational structure for the US State Department.  The proposed reorganization chart may be accessed HERE. It was introduced through a Press Statement the full text of which was this:

Over the past quarter century, the domestic operations of the State Department have grown exponentially, resulting in more bureaucracy, higher costs, and fewer results for the American people. Since my first day as Secretary, I have said that this Department must move at the speed of relevancy and, in April announced a broad reorganization of the Department to better achieve that goal. Today, we took the next step in that process by notifying Congress of how we plan to do that.

The plan submitted to Congress was the result of thoughtful and deliberative work by senior Department leadership. We have taken into account feedback from lawmakers, bureaus, and long-serving employees. The reorganization plan will result in a more agile Department, better equipped to promote America’s interests and keep Americans safe across the world.

Click here to view the new organizational chart for the U.S. State Department [89 KB].

One might better appreciate the changes, or its signalling, if not its effectiveness as a function of prior organizational. The November 2004 US State Department Organizational Chart (President Bush 2); November 2016 (President Obama); and May 2024 (President Biden).

China; Regulations on the Management of the Public Security Video Imaging Information System [公共安全视频图像信息系统管理条例]

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For those who missed it, new regulations on the placement of surveillance equipment became effective 1 April 2025. Called Regulations on the Management of the Public Security Video Imaging Information System [公共安全视频图像信息系统管理条例], the regulation is meant to provide a framework for balancing the safeguarding of public security and the protection rights to privacy and personal information. Laney Zhang, Law Library of Congress prepared an excellent summary of the measures in English posted May 19, 2025 (available here) and reproduced below. The original text of the measure also follows below.

The provisions are fairly straightforward.  It only bears remembering that the object of the regulation are video imaging.  It has nothing to say about the placement of audio or other non-visual surveillance
devices anywhere.

 

Great Wall and Silk Roads: 新时代的中国国家安全 (2025年5月）[China's National Security in the New Era (May 2025)]--State Council [国务院] White Paper [白皮书]

 

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On 12 May 2025, the State Council Information Office released the white paper "China's National Security in the New Era" [新时代的中国国家安全]. It makes for a quite interesting read. The original White paper along with a crude English translation follows below (全文如下).  It makes especially good reading when considered against the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency: "2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment (11 May 2025).

The American effort starts from the outside and then works their way to and through the national borders. It focuses on foreign States, other entities and the tools they use. That is, The American analytics starts from the outside and consider its projection inward. The object then is a negative--to identify and contain threats projected inward, however these terms are defined and applied to the contemporary landscape. Chinese analysis seems to start from the inside and then project internal needs outward. For China, that means starting from the position of the preservation and enhancement of internal stability ans security, then moving to the identification of those factors necessary to ensure both in a context of achieving forward looking planning, and then projecting these needs outward to give form and meaning to their external relations. 

There is a foundational semiotics to the comparison that may be of importance as the people charged to managing the relations between these two political spaces are caused to speak rather than past each other--and looking beyond the increasingly tedious public performance and reinforcement of the usually unstated premises that shape the way in which each side approaches the other. for consumption by the media and from there injected into national public discourse.  What joins these analytic organizational structures is the strict differentiation between outside and inside. But beyond that basic starting point, the differentiation is infused with quite different significance. 

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For the Chinese the outside is inherently instrumental and sometimes dangerous.  It is instrumental in the sense that their greatest utility is in their contribution to internal policy goals--in line with the fundamentals of New Era Marxist-Leninist views. It is dangerous in the sense that these outside forces--whether seeping in from States, religious, economic, social or cultural organizations--can constitute a threat to internal stability and disrupt the policy goals and organization of the State. Threat, then, acquires a quite specific meaning,  one quite different from its understanding in the American context. The "Great Wall" imagery dominates:  万众一心，就能筑起国家安全坚不可摧新的长城，战胜前进道路上的一切风险挑战，赢得和平发展机遇。[With everyone working together, we can build a new indestructible Great Wall of national security, overcome all risks and challenges on the road ahead, and win opportunities for peaceful development.]. Within that "security Wall" are the objects of security (新时代的中国国家安全). Beyond the wall are its instruments, instruments against which projections of power may be necessary, but for which cultivation and organization may be more effective--the Belt & Road Initiative, the construction of Chinese Socialist Internationalism and the like. Outside security is always a function of inside security and the needs of the State to guide the development of thew nation along its guided pathways. Threat is subversion of the internal order and everything must be considered for its threat level; projections outside both contain threat and sanitize external forces so that their threat internally may be de-natured.

For the U.S. the outside is irrelevant except as a space for private exploitation, the power to do so must be protected from threat both within this outside space and to the extent it seeks to project its own interests into the U.S. This aligns with  a system that is driven through autonomous economic, social, and cultural activities of people and groups, the activities of which are to be facilitated by the State and its organs. There is little sense (except recently perhaps in connection with the corruption of elections, and even more recently with respect to the corruption of the populace), in this viewpoint, that the outside contributes to State planning or policy, but rather that it contributes to private action.  The limiting element was invasion or incursion, now a subject (or ought to be a subject) of lively debate. Threat, then, acquires a meaning grounded in both protection against incursion (traditionally physical but now intangible as well) and protective of private protections of transactional power abroad. The nature of that threat and those borders might shift from Administration to Administration, but its essence remains unchanged. Threat is a threat to the autonomy of the constituent parts of the Republic--and those threats to the extent they affect the insider  are understood in terms of subversion, deception, fraud, and incursion. Incursion, traditionally formal and military, has since 2001 at least acquired an increasingly broader dimension).  

Threat, then, in the Chinese context, acquires a quite specific meaning,  one quite different from its understanding in the American context.  Chinese National Security  is grounded in the long historical process of safeguarding and realizing the “两大奇迹” [Two Miracles]: 正确处理改革发展稳定关系，书写了经济快速发展和社会长期稳定“两大奇迹”；坚持走和平发展道路，为改革开放和现代化建设营造了良好安全环境。[We have correctly handled the relationship between reform, development and stability, creating the "two miracles" of rapid economic development and long-term social stability; we have adhered to the path of peaceful development and created a good and safe environment for reform, opening up and modernization.]. ([新时代的中国国家安全], foreword). 

The rest is detail wrapped around the organization of the White Paper itself. That organization is divided into five parts: (1) China injects certainty and stability into a world of turmoil (the overall internal and external security situation); (2) The overall national security concept provides guidance for national security in the new era (the historical resilience and orienting perspectives of Chinese approaches to security threats); (3) Providing solid support for the steady and long-term development of China's modernization (the centrality of Chinese Socialist Modernization (development) to the security architecture and threat assessment process); (4) Consolidate security in development and seek development in security (the risk parameters of modernization in the overall security situation context); (5) Implement the Global Security Initiative and Promote International Common Security (projecting the Chinese approach to international threat management into global discourse as the foundational narrative of security). It ends with a Socialist variant of America First: 在追求自身安全的同时，将与各国携手共商共建共享国际共同安全，为世界持久和平、普遍安全而努力奋斗。["While pursuing its own security, it will work with all countries to discuss, build and share international common security, and strive for lasting peace and universal security in the world."] ([新时代的中国国家安全], conclusion). The pathways are different, perhaps, but the ultimate objectives tend to converge.

The White Paper "China's National Security in the New Era" [新时代的中国国家安全] appears below in its original Chinese and in a crude English translation.

President Trump: "Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 2025" and Brief Reflections on this Day Set Aside for Remembering and Honoring those Who Died in Service to the Republic

 

Pix Credit New York Times

Memorials have two distinct meanings. It is deeply embedded in the act or action of memory--remembering, calling up a thing, act, circumstance that has already occurred--and in the process making it both present and substantial.  One travels back in time to retrieve a memory that is then brought forward so that it might in the form of recollection remain present. But memorial is also an object--the thing that is created in order to anchor the recollection, the bringing forward to the present from out of the past--that signifies the memory for individuals and collectives.  It is meant to lock in place the meaning of a memory.  Memorial may also be performed, especially by actions and ceremonies conducted around the objects that solidify both the memory and its meaning. All three of these senses of memorial have become embedded in the traditions by which the Republic recollects the sacrifice of its military, brings that memory forward to the present, and intensifies its meaning through ceremonies conducted around spaces reserved as the resting places of the dead whose memory gives meaning not just to the event, and to the meaning of the sacrifice of the dead, but in the process to also reinforce the meaning and essence of the Republic in the mirror of the dead and their sacrifice. That, perhaps, might well serve to understand and perhaps intensify the importance of Memorial Day on the U.S., the day set aside to mourn and in tribute to those who served and sacrificed for the nation servicing it its armed forces. 

As is customary, on 25 May 2025 President Trump issued a Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 2025. It reads in full as follows:

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION

Memorial Day is a sacred day of remembrance, reverence, and gratitude for the brave patriots who have laid down their lives in service to our great Nation. Throughout our history, brave men and women have been called to defend the cause of liberty on foreign shores in defense of our homeland. Their noble sacrifices are marked by flag-draped coffins and the silent sorrows of those left behind. We must never forget those who have given everything for our country.

America’s Gold Star Families — whose sons, daughters, wives, and husbands are among the honored — endure unfathomable heartache. Their loved ones selflessly gave everything to protect our sovereignty. They have our unwavering support, deepest gratitude, and highest respect. The lives lost in war serve as a solemn reminder of why we must pursue peace through strength.

We are eternally indebted to our Nation’s fallen heroes. On this solemn day, as we honor their sacrifice, the First Lady and I ask all citizens to join us in prayer that Almighty God may comfort those who mourn, grant protection to all who serve, and bring blessed peace to the world.

In honor of all of our fallen heroes, the Congress, by a joint resolution approved May 11, 1950, as amended (36 U.S.C. 116), has requested the President issue a proclamation calling on the people of the United States to observe each Memorial Day as a day of prayer for permanent peace and designating a period on that day when the people might unite in prayer. The Congress, by Public Law 106-579, has also designated 3:00 p.m. local time on that day as a time for all Americans to observe, in their own way, the National Moment of Remembrance.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Memorial Day, May 26, 2025, as a day of prayer for permanent peace, and I designate the hour beginning in each locality at 11:00 a.m. of that day as a time when people might unite in prayer. I ask all Americans to observe the National Moment of Remembrance beginning at 3:00 p.m. local time on Memorial Day. I also request the Governors of the United States and its Territories, and the appropriate officials of all units of government, to direct that on Memorial Day the flag be flown at half-staff until noon on all buildings, grounds, and naval vessels throughout the United States and in all areas under its jurisdiction and control. I also request citizens to display the flag at half-staff from their homes for the customary forenoon period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fourth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.

DONALD J. TRUMP

There were words that were meant, perhaps to resonate in this Prayer proclamation: sovereignty, peace through strength, defend the cause of liberty on foreign shores in defense of our homeland, patriots, sacrifice, bring blessed peace to the world. The prayer-proclamation was delivered within days of the delivery of a different sort of invocation, the Defense Intelligence Agency's 2025 Threat Assessment (discussed here). It is only fitting that the Presidential prayer-proclamation be read together with the assessment of the tasks that will require more sacrifice before any sort of dream of peace to the world will be realized. That knowledge of past sacrifices and those sacrifices yet to be made, and with those who have and will make sacrifices for the Republic, along with those of their loved ones, firmly in mind, reminds us of our debt, and that the memorial we offer today extends not just to the past but also into the future.

Defense Intelligence Agency: "2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment (11 May 2025)

 

 Jeffrey Kruse, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force and Director if the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has transmitted to the Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations of the United States House of Representatives a document that was made publicly available. It is entitled "2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment" (11 May 2025). It is also available on the website of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee website. The DIA 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment" is one of several produced by State organs: See  Homeland Security 2025 Threat Assessment; DEA 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment; 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The U.S. Secret Service runs a National Threat Assessment Center "provide research and guidance in direct support of the Secret Service protective mission, and to others with public safety  responsibilities." And so on.  The extent to which these are coordinated remains a mystery though one would expect both inter-agency rivalry, competition and cooperation. More important are questions of transposition--are the threat reports using the same language and assessing using the same values and analytics at least with respect to impacts assessment.

 The object of the publication and its public circulation was described in its Introduction:

Thank you for the invitation to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA’s) assessment
of the global security environment. This year, more than in years past, the threat landscape is
changing rapidly and we are using this Statement for the Record to convey not only what we see as the current threats, but also to illuminate the trends and threats we see going forward that we must address. While additional details are available at higher classifications, we believe that providing this opening statement is a critical service for the Congress and the American public.

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It makes for interesting reading, though there are no surprises.  It is more a summary of what has been seeping out of the intelligence establishment to its favored (or disfavored) channels of communication for quite some time.  But it is no less necessary for that.  The constitution of an effective narrative requires both repetition and performance. Performances, like Greek tragedy, or mid 20th century musical comedy, requires both a well known framework full of familiar characters and some plot twists to make the performance feel fresh and contemporary--especially for public facing performance that may become part of the political discourse. It also requires continuity--even as the "tone at the top" changes with administration.  Presidents come and go--and members of the Congress come and go usually at longer intervals given the nature of the electoral system from the middle of the last century--but threats are forever. The most significant consequence of the notion of the eternal threat at the macro level (not an unreasonable baseline premise and one that accords with thee times) is the perhaps fatal transposition of that major major into its minor forms--application to micro level threats in situ against a host of identified threat agents, usually grouped around increasingly old-fashioned notions that there is a hierarchy of threat starting with what now passes for UN worthy-of-recognition States, and then followed by a motley crew of so-called bandits, criminal elements, out-of-state-control organization, zealots in various stages of psychosis lumped together as non-State actors. The result appears to be a desire not to end threat but to manage threat that one assumes will never go away. The organization of the State, and its economic, social, cultural, and normative lives appear now wrapped around both the major premise and its application in micro-situations.  

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Forever threats, then, are managed, they are not extinguished; and one can organize an international order around those premises. The idea is not unreasonable where the baseline for threat assessment springs from irreconcilable differences among collective forces. That forever nature of threat is enhanced since the end of the last global war in 1945(ish) as a consequence of the architecture developed to end threat.  The effort toward global convergence perhaps unconsciously but certainly with enough arrogance to produce its own resistance, was meant perhaps to overcome this problem of the eternal threat, the phenomenology of which was expressed in managing all threat rather than considering alternatives. In this respect, humans are not anything if not brilliant magicians in the art of irony and self-defeating structuralist idealism. Or even better magicians in veiling the essence of the operational precises of collective interaction with the soothing normative constructs of a converging ideal in which threat might be managed away to insignificance. Either way, the result was the same, and not unreasonable, though difficult to discuss bluntly with democratic populations. In this case one has constructed a set of relationships, structures, and expectations directed toward preserving a (the) status quo, and tolerating periodic eruptions, but never decisively enough to end threat, produces a situation in which threat is hardly ever existential (as that may be defined) but always bubbling. The object is to prevent major eruption but to tolerate and perhaps make instruments of minor ones. One need not read much to understand that this has been the phenomenology of peace since the 1950s, replacing the older model which always looking for total victory, achieved neither totality nor victory that could be savored for long. The result is the construction of systems of threat management which aligns with power hierarchies among states.  

If all threat, then, must be managed, the issue for the managers revolves around the premises, analytics and fulfillment of welfare maximizing management, as well as the development of a narrative architecture around all of these activities. The fundamental issue for policy is to define the parameters within which assessment of an optimum level and force of threat may be achieved. That produces an analytical cocktail of ideology, politics, security, and objectives that are both offensive and defensive. These, in turn, are shaped by the political worldviews of those shaping the approach to such analytics (see, e.g., The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux). Nonetheless, the agitation of threat, and the nature of its management depends in large part on its risk and severity. And risk and severity is measured as a function of impact. Eradication of threat upsets the global order and requires action that is now impossible given the defining parameters of the global order and its expectations built around ceasefire, negotiation and a preference for even a hostile status quo where the value producing assets which are the objects to which threat is directed can be protected (Cf here). Within this broader framework, the notion of threat and its management is highly contextual, and the more powerful the state the more likely that the context will affect not just the State but all other States connected to it.

None of this is good or bad, and it is certainly not unique to the intelligence establishment in the U.S. But it does help situate the 2025 DIA Worldwide Threat Assessment study and perhaps to be able to read it more intelligently. Beyond the usual actors, the most interesting aspect of the 2025 Assessment, and one in line with the Trump Administration's effort to help the the legal establishment understand that threat can no longer be understood in 18th century terms (see e.g.Invasion or Incursion by Non-State Actors: President Trump Issues "Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua") is the focus on non-state actors as an organized threat force with capabilities that may effectively match those of States. But that focus is largely confined to the category "National Security Threats Expanding Fueled by Advanced Technology" (Assessment pp. 1 et seq.) and "Foreign Intelligence Threats" (Assessment pp. 36 et seq.). Yet the focus is still on states--and principally peer and quasi-peer States. That makes sense in large part-- States still represent the principal source of organized threat; States also still manage non-State organizations with threat capabilities in ways that are similar to the way that States use State based proxies to project power (see, e.g., Assessment pp. 18-20).  But it is now more pressing to begin to consider these non-State actors as autonomous, at least to some extent--autonomous enough to both please themselves and their masters. That merits more more a small section on "Terrorism" (Assessment pp. 24-26). Beyond that the Assessment suggests the not unexpected--threat levels are rising, they exist everywhere, they are driven through hierarchies of power, and motivated both by those who would see the United States destroyed, to those who would see the Republic merely made irrelevant and useful for its resources and productivity. 

And lurking beneath all of this are three critical threat sources none of which can be well managed today: legal structures and habits that are historically anchored; technology; and the structural inhibitions of a global ordering that remains useful now as a framework but also serves increasingly as an instrument for strategic destabilization (perhaps a fancy way of suggesting that the classification system that starts with a distinction between domestic and foreign threat is now as outmoded  as dial up internet services). But most of all,  in threat management regimes, even ones that are guided by principles of transactions rather than normative vision, it may be necessary for States like the U.S. to re-order their threat analysis from state-centered to one in which  one can start from the presumption that dominant States are apex powers, but that below perhaps second rank states, the difference between state and non-state actors disappears. In that context one might, at a certain level, understand the equivalence of the threat of global criminal organizations, global enterprises, global identity movements, and States. At the most granular level, a group of teenagers working in the basement of their parents or friends and with access to appropriate knowledge, may pose as great a threat as middling States.  That threat architecture is on the radar here, but the analytics of threat and its management strategies is still in its infancy. The problem isn't the capabilities of threat assessment, rather it is the inhibitions on that assessment by the premises and expectations on which it is currently understood and data is valued and analytics are constructed. One ought to be able to imagine that in the secret parts of the Report and within the assessment groups within these services, these are the questions answers to which are being sought, and with them suggestions about the need to evolve the threat response architecture of the Republic to suit the times. And with those changes might have to come substantial rethinking of the normative conceits (all necessary in any point in the historical development of a State) that brought the nation through threats after 1945 but which appear increasingly of relevance only to historians (and for policymakers perhaps an informed basis for moving forward).

CfP SCOTUS Blockbuster Cases 2025; Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law

 

 I am happy to pass along a CfP  from Tracy Thomas, Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law, for the Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law for participation in a written symposium for the Center's journal, ConLawNOW. . 

Information follows below.

U.S. "Presidential Message on Cuban Independence Day, 2025" and the Narratives of Revolution

 

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 The White House posted a message on the anniversary of the day traditionally celebrated as Independence Day in Cuba. That message, Presidential Message on Cuban Independence Day, 2025, reinforced a number of narrative points, some of which might be worth emphasizing.  

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The first was to shift narrative focus back to the day traditionally celebrated as the day on which sovereign authority was transferred to the Cuban people in 1902 (20 May) and away from the 26th of July, the date celebrated as the day of Revolutionary Victory by the forces led by Fidel Castro in 1959. The difference in narrative is important.  Traditionally, 20 May 1902 marked the date that the United States transferred authority from its military occupation forces to Cuban authorities, and when Tomás Estrada Palma was sworn in as the first president of the Cuban Republic, four years or so after the Spanish conceded the end of their control over what had been their overseas colony. For the current government, it could be argued that many have taken the position that Cuban independence was not established either in 1898, nor in 1902, but with the victory of Fidel Castro in 1959. The narrative starting point then orients any analysis of Cuban history. 

The second suggests the continuing role of the United States as the protector of the Cuban people  (as in the late 19th century) against oppression, whether foreign or domestic. That narrative line is also critically important and underscores the consistent position of the United States in seeking regime change in Cuba as a condition for normalized relations. Indeed, even during the briefest of thawing in relations toward the end of the Obama Administration, President Obama made clear that regime change was never off the table, though  persuasion rather than force was to be the method of choice. See  Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba (22 March 2016). 

I’ve made it clear that the United States has neither the capacity, nor the intention to impose change on Cuba. What changes come will depend upon the Cuban people. We will not impose our political or economic system on you. We recognize that every country, every people, must chart its own course and shape its own model. But having removed the shadow of history from our relationship, I must speak honestly about the things that I believe -- the things that we, as Americans, believe. As Marti said, “Liberty is the right of every man to be honest, to think and to speak without hypocrisy.”

So let me tell you what I believe. I can't force you to agree, but you should know what I think. I believe that every person should be equal under the law. (Applause.) Every child deserves the dignity that comes with education, and health care and food on the table and a roof over their heads. (Applause.) I believe citizens should be free to speak their mind without fear -- (applause) -- to organize, and to criticize their government, and to protest peacefully, and that the rule of law should not include arbitrary detentions of people who exercise those rights. (Applause.) I believe that every person should have the freedom to practice their faith peacefully and publicly. (Applause.) And, yes, I believe voters should be able to choose their governments in free and democratic elections. (Applause.) ( Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba (22 March 2016).)

Those words rankled in Cuba, of course, and the results were predictable, except perhaps to the American elites.  At a time when actions would have resonated better, the temptation to use words overpowered reason, and here we are. 

Third, at its most pointed was a message--that indeed the revolution is not over, and that what had been started in the countryside with the resistance to the March 1952 coup  has yet to run its course. This is not just the usual and tired language of regime change.  Done better--and perhaps Secretary Rubio is up to the task for which he is a notable champion--the narrative recasts the Revolution in a way that permits its rhetorical strengths to be turned against it. That is, the language of the Revolution incomplete, the language of the Revolution abandoned, the language of the Revolution betrayed might go much father in advancing the desires of the United States than the usual self serving rhetoric that is as worn out on its side, as that which remains vibrant only perhaps for those who still remain and remember 1959, and the leadership of the established order. The narrative shift would effectively transpose the notion of the striving for the perfection of the revolution from the revolutionaries and their allies who ascended to power at the moment of the defeat of the last non-communist leader in 1959 and move it to a new vanguard of revolutionary forces seeking to perfect the cause but for quite different ends. There is a hint of this here.  

That could have been the aim but the U.S. is traditionally not good at things like this. The biggest obstacle, of course, are self-imposed.  That could have been the aim but the U.S. is traditionally not good at things like this. The current Cuban government can only rejoice in that knowledge, though they earn little for the effort of stabilizing their version of the revolution as a perpetual state of misery (see Cuba and the Constitution of a Stable State of Misery: Ideology, Economic Policy, and Popular Discipline). Like many factions in Cuba, and like the Partido Comunista de Cuba itself, most groups look backwards--to that critical day in January 1959.  One want to return to the moment before 1 January 1959, the other wants to freeze in time that moment of victory and protect its a-historical essence. (Discussed in the essays, Cuba's Caribbean Marxism (2018)).

In the meantime, the games continue around the equilibrium point of the unfinished revolution the direction of which remains an open issue. The text of Presidential Message on Cuban Independence Day, 2025follows below. 

In the Quest for a Draft of a Legally Binding International Instrument to Regulate Business and Human Rights: Second and third thematic consultations (3-5 June 2025)

 

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On the basis of Resolution 26/9 (2014), the Human Rights Council established an open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights. The mandate for the OEIGWG, buttressed by a cohesive and like minded group of supporters, was to elaborate an "international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises." This OEIGWG has sought to do with great vigor, in the process putting together an international network of people who, believing the necessity for legalizing a system of public mandatory human rights due diligence systems, have labored for more than a decade to produce a draft of something that appeals to them and their supporters.

Having come close to something that appears to have the characteristics of a finalized draft, the OEIGWG has been engaged through a set of close to final consultations:

At its 56th session, on 11 July 2024, the Human Rights Council adopted decision 56/116 to enhance the support capabilities of the OEIGWG, mainly through intersessional thematic consultations in Geneva for three years (2025-2027), with the assistance of the legal experts of the working group for the purpose of discussing clusters of articles of the draft legally binding instrument currently being negotiated in line with the mandate established by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 26/9. Before each session of the working group, the Chair-Rapporteur will make available a summary report of the thematic consultations with a view to inform and support that session.

In the Chair-Rapporteur’s recommendation included in paragraph 29(d) of the report on the 10th session of the working group, he committed “to present a confirmed 2025 roadmap for the implementation of HRC Decision 56/116, including the holding of intersessional thematic consultations for the purpose of discussing clusters of articles of the draft legally binding instrument, in line with the mandate established by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 26/9, with the assistance, as deemed necessary, of the legal experts”. (here).

The updated Chair-Rapporteur 2025 Roadmap and Methodology for implementation of HRD Dec 56-116 envisioned four thematic consultations to be completed before the start of the OEIGWG's 11th session.  he The first thematic consultation took place from 15 to 16 April in Geneva; the second was to take place in early June 2025. But just when things appeared to be coming together the UN encountered significant budgetary issues, issues substantial enough to threaten the planned events. 

However, the UN appears to have cobbled together enough money to hold the second and third thematic consultations (3-5 June 2025, Palais des Nations, conference room V)

The second and third thematic consultations will take place from 3 to 5 June 2025 in Geneva, in room V of the Palais des Nations (in person only). The second thematic consultation will focus on Article 6 (Prevention) and Article 8 (Legal liability), and the third thematic consultation will focus on Article 9 (Jurisdiction), and Article 11 (Applicable law), as well as Article 10 (Statute of limitations) if time permits, of the updated draft legally binding instrument with the textual proposals submitted by States during the ninth and tenth sessions of the OEIGWG. (here).

Documents for the sessions follow below. The current version of the Draft Treaty may be accessed HERE.